



† Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law.  Many thanks go 
to Tom Baker and other participants in the Journal of Law & Innovation’s Symposium on 




2 For an excellent discussion of the challenges regulators face in regulating new 
innovations, see generally Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841 (2011). 
3 See infra Part III. 
 
 
4 See, e.g., JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82–83 
(1975) (describing progress as the “destruction of capital values in the strata with which the 
new commodity or method of production competes”). 
5 See Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. 
CHI. L. J. 173, 215-22 (2013) (discussing the hazards of heralding the latest advancement as 
necessarily the best). 
6 See Eric Biber et al., Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the 
Model T to Airbnb, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1565 (2017) (describing a “policy disruption” as 
“disjunction between the structure of the regulatory system and the industry that is being 
regulated”). 
7 See Wu, supra note 2, at 1851 (describing such speed-related issues that arise when 




and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 239 (2012) 
(discussing that “the pace of innovation has left financial regulators and regulation chronically 
behind the curve”). 
8 Wu, supra note 2, at 1849-50 (pointing out that the regulatory landscape may be set 
before any of the key players have even had a chance to weigh in). 
9 See Allen, supra note 5, at 223 (arguing that as an industry grows, regulators will be 
more subject to capture by certain interest groups). 
10 See Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang & Cheng-Yun Tsang, RegTech and the New Era of 
Financial Regulators: Envisaging More Public-Private Partnership Models of Financial 
Regulation 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 354, 360-61 (2018) (discussing the problems associated with 
regulators’ naturally slower speeds). 
11 See also Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” In Financial Stability 
Oversight Council, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 1087, 1102 (2015) (discussing the related phenomenon of 
cognitive capture, in which regulators take on the worldview of the industry they regulate).  
For a survey on the administrative law literature on informational and cultural capture, see 
Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543, 1560-63 (2018). 
12 See Allen, supra note 11, at 1102 (discussing the increased risk of capture when the 
public loses interest in regulation). 
13 See Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept 
Article on Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures 66 DUKE L. J. 567, 594 (2016) 
(“market participants quickly and rationally adjust their behavior around the ‘certainty’ created 




14 For a discussion of the term “regulatory arbitrage,” see Elizabeth Pollman, Tech, 
Regulatory Arbitrage, and Limits, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 567 (2019). 
15 Id. at 8. 
16 Id. 
17 JOHN ARMOUR ET AL, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 61-69 (2016). 
18 FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY (FCA), REGULATORY SANDBOX 5 (Nov. 2015), https:// 
www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf.  
19 Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21, § 6 (U.K.) (amending Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, c. 1E). 
20 Id. (amending Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 1C). 




22 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) 
(2018). 
23 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, About the CFTC, 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/anr/anrabout99.htm. 
24 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, About the SEC, 
https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml. 
25 The SEC arguably has a financial stability mandate as well. See generally Hilary J. 
Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. CORP. L. 715 (2018). 
26 12 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2011). 
27 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (OCC), POLICY STATEMENT ON 





CHARTERS (Jul. 31, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/pub-
other-occ-policy-statement-fintech.pdf. 
28 Id. at 1. 
29 John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory 
World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 27 (2016).   
30 Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Disrupting FinTech Law, 18 FINTECH L. REP. 1, 5 (2015).  
31 Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 113 (2020). 
32 Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online Peer-to-Peer Lending in the 
Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory Regime for an Evolving 
Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 491-95 (2012) 
33 For further discussion of the marketplace lending model and applicable regulations, see 




34 Douglas, supra note 29, at 38. 
35 CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB NOW ACCEPTING COMPLAINTS 
ON CONSUMER LOANS FROM ONLINE MARKETPLACE LENDER (Mar. 7, 2016), available at 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-now-accepting-complaints-on-
consumer-loans-from-online-marketplace-lender/. 
36 Douglas, supra note 29, at 30-32. 
37 OCC, supra note 27. 
38 Marketplace loans are typically under $50,000 for small businesses and around $10,000 
for individual consumers, see Marketplace Lending 2.0: Bringing on the Next Stage in 
Lending, DELOITTE, at 7 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financial-services/us-fsi-
markeplace-lending2.pdf. 
39 Allen, supra note 31, at 105-6. 




41 Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 87 (2017). 
42 Allen, supra note 31, at 128-9. 
43 For a discussion of the banking supervisory process, see RICHARD S. CARNELL, 
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 344-9 
(6th ed. 2017). 
44 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ONLINE 
MARKETPLACE LENDING, 1 (2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/Opportunities_and_Challenges_in_Online_
Marketplace_Lending_white_paper.pdf.  
45 Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart 
Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FINCORP. & FIN. L. 31, 93 (2017).  
46 Dirk A. Zetzsche ET AL., The Future of Data-Driven Finance and RegTech 48 (Eur. 
Banking Inst., Working Paper No. 2019/35), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3359399. 
47 In 2016, IBM published a report that found that “90 percent of the data in the world 
today has been created in the last two years alone.” See, IBM Marketing Cloud, 10 Key Trends 




48 “To evaluate a bank’s financial soundness, examiners use the Uniform Financial 
Institutions Rating System, commonly known as the CAMELS system.” CARNELL, MACY & 
MILLER, supra note 43, at 346. As part of this assessment, “[t]hey scrutinize the bank’s 
lending and investment standards, internal controls, and risk-identification and loan-
administration practices.” Id. at 248. 
49 Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial 
Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1144-5 (2012). 
50 Id. 
51 Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2018). 
52 15 U.S.C.§ 1691(a). 





54 12 CFR § 1002.6(a) ( Supp. I 2019).  
55 Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 
671, 675 (2016).  
56 Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial 
Intelligence and Big Data, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 65), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347959.  
57 Id. at 63. (“[T]he first step…is for the statistical model under consideration to be re-




58 Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services 
Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 719-20 (2018). 
59 FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE, 2 (2016), 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf. 
60 See, e.g., DELOITTE, The Next Frontier: The Future Of Automated Financial Advice In 
The UK, at 22 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-uk-
updated-robo-advice-new-horizons-layout-mww8.pdf (“[I]t is possible that we will see 
automated advisers enter more sophisticated advice markets and be able to deal with issues as 
complex as tax and holistic financial planning . . . .”)  
61 Allen, supra note 31, at 12 (“For example, Betterment has registered with the SEC . . . 
[and] . . . registered with FINRA.”). 
62 Allen, supra note 25, at 726. (“[T]he FSOC issued a Notice Seeking Comment on Asset 
Management Products and Activities that stated ‘the SEC’s initiatives are not specifically 
focused on financial stability.’”) 
63 Allen, supra note 31, at 27 (“[W]hen financial decision-making is automated and 
performed by a few algorithms rather than a crowd of individuals, market behavior is likely to 




64 FIN. STABILITY BD., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN 
FINANCIAL SERVICES: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS 
at 30 (2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P011117.pdf.  
65 Allen, supra note 31, at 29. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 45. 
68 The Federal Reserve creates “hypothetical macroeconomic scenarios that incorporate an 
assumed sharp deterioration in economic and financial conditions.” Daniel K. Tarullo, 
Governor, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve Third Annual Stress Test Modeling 
Symposium: Stress Testing after Five Years (Jun. 25, 2014), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20140625a.htm; Allen, supra note 
31, at 45 (“The difficulty and cost of developing such scenarios should not be understated.”). 
69 The FSOC recently committed to an “activities-based approach” to protecting financial 
stability. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL PROPOSES 
CHANGES TO NONBANK DESIGNATIONS GUIDANCE (Mar. 6, 2019), 





nonbank financial company designations] would implement an activities-based approach to . . . 
financial stability.”).  Though some have questioned how genuine this push for activities-based 
regulation is, see, e.g., Jeremy C. Kress et al., Regulating Entities and Activities: 
Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92. S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1505 
(2019), if the FSOC is truly committed to activities-based regulation, creating hypothetical 
data sets for robo-advisory firms would help address the threats to financial stability posed by 
this activity.  
70 COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1019 (9th Ed.2020). 
71 Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L. J. 1267, 1277, 1290 (2017). 
72 MARK JICKLING & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DERIVATIVES 
REGULATION IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 27 (2011). 




74 Id. at 31. 
75 STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, CORPORATE FINANCE 316 (2014). 
76 RENA S. MILLER & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE VII, 
DERIVATIVES 5 (2012). 
77 Id; see also THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT, 266. (2011) [hereinafter FCIC Report]. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 3. 
81 Id. at 3. 
82 Id. at 5. 
83 See, e.g., ISDA & King & Wood Mallesons, Smart Derivatives Contracts: From 





84 Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L. J. 313, 333 
(2017); Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 383–84 
(2018).  
85 LabCFTC, A Primer on Smart Contracts, 7 (Nov. 27, 2018), available at 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11/LabCFTC_PrimerSmartContracts112718.pdf. 
86 Id. at 15. 
87 Id. at 25. 
88 Id. at 27-29. 
89 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. 
L. J. 445, 462-463 (2013).  





91 FCIC Report, supra note 77, at 266. 
92 Id. at 266. 
93 Id. at 268. 
94 Id. at 268-69. 
95 FCIC Report, supra note 77, at 344-345. 






98 Allen, supra note 31, at 141. 
99 Dirk Broeders and Jermy Prenio, Innovative Technology in Financial Supervision 
(Suptech) – The Experience of Early Users, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS FIN. STABILITY 
INST. INSIGHTS ON POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION NO. 9, 3 (Jul. 2018). 
100 Allen, supra note 31, at 142. 




102 Id. at 580. 
103 For a more global discussion of these efforts, see Ross P. Buckley et al., Building 
Fintech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs and Beyond, 4 (Euro. Banking 
Inst., Working Paper Series no. 53, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3455872. 
104 Press Release, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, Financial Conduct Authority’s Regulatory 
Sandbox Opens to Applications (May 9, 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-
releases/financial-con- duct-authority’s-regulatory-sandbox-opens-applications.  






108 Id. at 597. 
109 Buckley et al., supra note 103, at 7. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 4. 
112 Anthony C. Kaye, Utah’s New Regulatory Sandbox, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Jun. 
11, 2019), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2019/06/11/utahs-new-regulatory-
sandbox/. 
113 Hilary J. Allen, Sandbox Boundaries, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 299, 314 (2020) 
114 Wendy Kearns & Andrew J. Lorentz, Fintech Sandboxes – Update on State 
Approaches, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP BLOG (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.dwt.com/blogs/payment-law-advisor/2018/04/fintech-sandboxes—update-on-
state-approaches. 
115 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION, POLICY ON THE COMPLIANCE 




116 Id. at 48249. 
117 Kate Berry, State AGs Assail CFPB Plan to Build Fintech Sandbox, AM. BANKER 
(Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/state-ags-assail-cfpb-plan-to-build-
fintech-sandbox.).  
118 Allen, supra note 101, at 619-20. 
119 Buckley et al., supra note 103, at 7, 18. 
120 Id. at 25. 





122 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC INNOVATION PILOT 
PROGRAM 2 (Apr. 2019), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-
examination/responsible-innovation/occ-innovation-pilot-program.pdf. 
123 OCC, supra note 27, at 2. 
124 The OCC’s fintech charter would be a specialized national banking charter.  Id. 
National banking charters preempt the application of state law in circumstances where the state 
law would “prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.” 
Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 18 (1996).  
125 Gina Conheady, Is Fintech Ready for a Global Regulatory Sandbox?, A&L 
GOODBODY (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.algoodbody.com/insights-publications/is-fintech-
ready-for-a-global-regulatory-sandbox. 
126 Terms of Reference for Membership and Governance of the Global Financial 
Innovation Network (GFIN), FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Feb. 27, 2020), 
1https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/mou/gfin-terms-of-reference.pdf. 





128 Zetzsche et al., supra note 45 at 69-70; Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN) 
Consultation Document, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, 17 (Aug. 2018), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_global-financial-innovation-
network_consultation-document.pdf. 
129 Allen, supra note 11, at 1088.  See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Dynamic Precaution’ in 
Maintaining Financial Stability: The Importance of FSOC (Colum. L. and Econ., Working 
Paper No. 587, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3229518. 
130 MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY. 49, 63 (2nd 
ed., 2016). 
131 John C. Coffee Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform 





132 Buckley et al., supra note 103, at 6. 
133 Allen, supra note 101, at 606.  
134 FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, REGULATORY SANDBOXES LESSONS LEARNED REPORT 9 
(Oct. 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research-and-data/regulatory-sandbox-
lessons-learned-report.pdf. 
135 Allen, supra note 11, at 1103. 






137 Allen, supra note 101, at 636. 
138 “Suptech solutions have emerged only recently, with a marked take-off in 2019.”  
Simone de Castri et al., The Suptech Generations, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS FIN. 
STABILITY INST. INSIGHTS ON POL’Y IMPLEMENTATION NO. 1, 14 (Oct. 2019).  
139 Id. at 1; Yang & Tsang, supra note 10, at 366. (stating that Suptech is when financial 




140 For a discussion of the different meanings of the word “RegTech”, see Luca Enriques, 
Financial Supervisors and RegTech: Four Roles and Four Challenges (Revue Trimestrielle de 
Droit Financier 53, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3087292. 
141 De Castri et al., supra note 138, at 2 (stating most Suptech solutions are experimental 
in nature). 
142 Id. at 8. 
143 Id. at 10. 
144 Broeders & Prenio, supra note 999, at 3. ("Post-crisis regulatory reforms have led to an 
upsurge in reporting requirements. This increases the need for efficient and effective 
monitoring to benefit from the resulting boost in data availability”). 
145 De Castri et al., supra note 138, at 14. (stating Suptech solutions began to arise because 
of the burden on complying with regulations). 
146 Baxter, supra note 13 at 597. 
147 De Castri et al., supra note 138, at 11-12 (stating AI tools are well equipped to handled 
time-sensitive and unstructured data). 




149 An argument could be made that the CFPB engaged in SupTech experimentation from 
its inception, as it sought to be a data-driven, technologically-savvy agency.  Kennedy et al., 
supra note 49 at 1143.   However, under its current leadership, the CFPB’s Office of 
Innovation appears very innovator focused, with little apparent emphasis on developing new 
regulatory solutions in-house.  CFPB, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Announces 
Director for the Office of Innovation (Jul. 18, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/bureau-consumer-financial-protection-announces-director-office-innovation/.  
Similarly, materials available on the OCC’s Office of Innovation make no reference to 
SupTech or to RegTech more generally.  See, for example, OCC, Office of Innovation, 
https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/responsible-innovation/occ-
innovation-general-brochure.PDF. 
150 Michael S. Piwowar, Old Fields, New Corn: Innovation in Technology and Law, 
REMARKS AT THE 2018 REGTECH DATA SUMMIT (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/piwowar-old-fields-new-corn-innovation-technology-law. 






152 De Castri et al., supra note 138, at 10. 
153 Yang & Tsang, supra note 10, at 363; 367. 
154 Id. at 367. 
155 De Castri et al., supra note 138, at 14. 
156 Id. at 10. 
157 Broeders & Prenio, supra note 99, at 12-13. 
158 Allen, supra note 101, at 581. 
159 Allen, supra note 31, at 109. 
160 See e.g. Hilary J. Allen, Payments Failure (manuscript on file with author). 
 
 
161 De Castri et al., supra note 138, at 14.  
162 Enriques, supra note 140, at 5. (A supervisor can act as a developer of RegTech if the 
supervisor has people with the required skillset). 
163 De Castri et al., supra note 138, at 15. (Only a quarter of suptech initiatives are 
developed by external vendors). 
164 For a discussion of private firms’ analogous difficulties in overseeing outsourced 
technology development, see Veerle Colaert, RegTech as a Response to Regulatory Expansion 




166 Broeders & Prenio, supra note 99, at 18-19 (“Because of the scarcity of staff with the 
right background, each suptech solution may be dependent on just one or two key persons. . . . 
retaining qualified staff for the long term is likely to become increasingly difficult.”). 
167 Colaert, supra note 164, at 13. 
168  Id. at 18 (“Internal transparency should further guarantee that changes can be made to 
complex systems at a later stage, even when the original developers of the system are no 
longer available for support.”). 
169 Id. at 8 (“. . . RegTech has been claimed to offer massive cost savings.”).  
170 Enriques, supra note 140, at 5 (“. . . when in a position to exploit information 
asymmetries vis-à-vis supervisors as customers, rather cater to the interests of market players 




171 Yang & Tsang, supra note 10, at 400. 
172 De Castri et al., supra note 138, at 15 (“Academic partnerships, meanwhile, can be 
fruitful for exploratory projects on the cutting edge of suptech research.”). 
173 Broeders & Prenio, supra note 99, at 2. 
174 Id. 
175 See e.g. Hilary J. Allen, Payments Failure (manuscript on file with author). 
176 Interoperability is an identified goal of SupTech experimentation: “The key to effective 
OversightTech, or the use of RegTech by supervisors for oversight purposes, will be for the 
software to be interoperable (that is, able to dialogue) with ComplianceTech products and 
possibly even with Operations RegTech products.” Enriques, supra note 140, at 4. 




178 Wu, supra note 7, at 1850; Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: 
The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1651 (2008). 
179 Allen, supra note 31, at 109. 
180 Broeders & Prenio, supra note 99, at 13-14. 
181 Yang & Tsang, supra note 10, at 368-710. 





184 Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323 (2011).  
185 There are a number of international fora already working to coordinate SupTech 
experimentation, including the BIS’ Innovation Hub. De Castri et al., supra note 138, at 2.   
186 Baxter, supra note 13, at 603. 
187 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital 
Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 676 (2010).  
188 FINRA, TECHNOLOGY BASED INNOVATIONS FOR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
(“REGTECH”) IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 7 (Sept. 2018), available at 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2018_RegTech_Report.pdf. 
189 Baxter, supra note 13, at 603. 
190 Colaert, supra note 164, at 16. 
191 Colaert has cautioned against a similar outcome for private firms relying on RegTech 




192 Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Member, Fin. Policy Comm. & 
Vasileios Madouros, Economist, Bank of Eng., Speech at Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City’s 36th Economic Policy Symposium: The Dog and the Frisbee (Aug. 31, 2012), available 
at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2012/ah.pdf. 
193 Allen, supra note 5, at 209 et seq. 
194 Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA 
L. REV. 232, 232 (2018). 
